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ABSTRACT 
For many years, school districts throughout the United States have wrestled with questions about the scope of their 
authority to discipline student speech that takes place away from school.  Federal courts have handled many cases 
with differing outcomes.  The U.S. Supreme Court has been silent, however, denying review to at least seven cases 
in the last nine years.  This Article argues that the Supreme Court has passed up the cases because, while the 
factual outcomes at times appear in conflict, the legal analyses rely on the case of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.  Although it seems like chaos in lower federal courts, the 
Supreme Court may well have persuaded itself that there is no legal conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION  
For many years a legal and policy debate has raged in the United States 
over whether public school officials have the authority, consistent with the 
free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment,1 to regulate student 
expression that takes place outside of school.  The debate, with enormous 
practical stakes, involves school administrators, students, parents, social 
media companies, legislators, law enforcement, lawyers, and judges.2 
A prominent voice missing from the debate is the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Since 2011, the Supreme Court has declined to review petitions for certiorari 
at least seven times in cases raising issues about punishment for off-campus 
speech by middle and high school students.3  
This hands-off approach has led even federal judges to call out for 
guidance from the high court.  U.S. District Court Judge John Jones wrote 
in 2016 that “we must observe that schools need clear guidance from . . . the 
Supreme Court as to whether and when they can regulate off-campus 
speech.”4 
As the plea from Judge Jones suggests, lower courts have reached 
different results, a few finding off-campus speech by students protected by 
the First Amendment, but most affirming the authority of school officials to 
discipline students for off-campus speech.  Why will the Supreme Court not 
step in to adopt a clear rule and provide guidance to schools and courts?  
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making laws “abridging the freedom of speech”).  
For application of the free-speech guarantee to the states, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (holding that freedom of speech is “among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
 2 The debate is captured in blog posts, media articles, court rulings, and many more sources.  See, 
e.g., Nat’l Const. Ctr. Staff, The Debate Over Student Off-Campus Speech and First Amendment Protection, 
CONST. DAILY (May 9, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/when-does-student-off-
campus-speech-get-first-amendment-protection/ (highlighting the belief that schools need 
“definition from federal appeals courts and the Supreme Court” on issues surrounding First 
Amendment rights and regulating students’ freedom of speech); see also David R. Wheeler, Do 
Students Still Have Free Speech in School?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2014/04/do-students-still-have-free-speech-in-school/360266/ (noting that 
the Internet has complicated recognized free-speech rights for students, with schools “regularly 
punish[ing] students for online comments, even if those comment are made away from school 
property and after school hours”). 
 3 See infra Part II, discussing the cases and denials of certiorari. 
 4 R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 646 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (upholding a high school’s 
suspension of a student for creating a Facebook post referring to a bomb potentially going off at 
school the next day). 
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Because the Supreme Court generally does not explain denials of petitions 
for certiorari, no one but the Justices knows for sure.  
This Article argues, based on a review of a dozen lower court rulings, that 
the most logical explanation is that the Supreme Court Justices do not believe 
that the differing results reached by lower courts reflect an actual 
disagreement in the federal courts of appeals that must be resolved.  Rather, 
it seems that the Supreme Court must believe that differences in outcomes in 
the lower courts are simply a reflection of factual differences in the many 
cases, rather than in the legal standard being applied. 
This Article first examines the foundational standard for free speech in 
public schools.  It then explores the differences in some of the lower court 
rulings to determine if there is disagreement over the appropriate legal 
standard.  Finally, this Article concludes with the view that, whether or not 
there is disagreement among the circuits, the Supreme Court ought to 
consider clarifying the standard that governs off-campus speech by public 
school students. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL CASES 
The Supreme Court has made clear, and virtually all lower courts accept 
the fact, that the starting point for analyzing any student speech case is 
derived from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.5  The 
landmark ruling began in 1965 when students in Des Moines, Iowa, were 
suspended for wearing black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War 
and to support a call for a Christmas holiday truce in the fighting.6  School 
officials adopted a rule against wearing armbands at school after they learned 
that John Tinker planned to wear one to his high school while his sister, Mary 
Beth Tinker, would wear one to her middle school.7  The suspensions were 
served, but the Tinker parents and the parents of other suspended students 
sued in a U.S. District Court to vindicate the students’ rights.8 
 
 5 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 6 Id. at 504. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
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A U.S. District Court judge in Des Moines dismissed the complaint, 
finding in favor of the school officials, and the U.S. Court of Appeals divided 
evenly after an en banc hearing, thereby affirming the District Court.9 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit by a vote of 7–2.  Justice 
Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Hugo Black and John 
Harlan dissented.10  The majority held, “It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”11  Justice Fortas admonished school 
officials that concern over possible disruption may not be enough to prohibit 
free speech.  He wrote in an almost poetic ode to free speech that 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression.”12  This is so because:  
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.  Any 
variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.  Any word spoken in 
class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of 
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.  But our 
Constitution says we must take this risk.13 
The line to be drawn by school officials, Justice Fortas said, is that they 
may not prohibit and discipline speech unless they can show that a student’s 
conduct “would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline 
of the school.”14  This standard, Justice Fortas said, should govern the entire 
experience at school, not merely classroom discussion.  It applied, he wrote, 
to “the authorized hours” of the school day.15 
The ruling in Tinker was the high point in the Supreme Court’s protection 
of student speech rights in public schools.  Critics have argued that several 
subsequent Supreme Court rulings cut back significantly on the protection 
for student speech.16  There are three rulings by the Supreme Court after 
 
 9 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 382 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), aff’g by 
an equally divided court, 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966). 
 10 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, 514–15, 526. 
 11 Id. at 506. 
 12 Id. at 508. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 513. 
 15 Id. at 512–13. 
 16 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825 (2009) (calling for a revitalization of the Tinker approach by the 
Supreme Court to provide for greater protection of student speech). 
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Tinker that have curtailed student speech rights, although they have not 
overruled Tinker.  
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,17 the Supreme Court upheld the 
suspension of high school student Matthew Fraser in Pierce County, 
Washington.  Fraser gave a nominating speech for a friend in a high school 
assembly.  His speech was filled with sexual innuendo which school officials 
said was lewd, vulgar, and inappropriate for the assembly audience, some of 
whom were ninth graders and only fourteen-years old.18  A federal district 
court in Washington ruled in Fraser’s favor, and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.19 
The Supreme Court opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger 
who was joined fully by four other Justices.  Two Justices, William Brennan 
and Harry Blackmun, concurred only in the Court’s judgment, and two 
others, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens, dissented.  Chief Justice 
Burger wrote, “Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school 
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse.”20  Indeed, Chief Justice Burger found Fraser’s speech so offensive 
that he did not include the text in the majority opinion; Fraser’s comments 
appear only in the opinion of Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment.21 
Chief Justice Burger noted in discussing Tinker that “the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings.”22  Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion 
distinguished the earlier ruling in Tinker as involving an attempt to suppress 
a particular political viewpoint.  Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within its 
permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his 
offensively lewd and indecent speech.  Unlike the sanctions imposed on the 
students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were 
unrelated to any political viewpoint.  The First Amendment does not prevent 
the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech 
such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.23 
 
 17 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 18 Id. at 677–78.  
 19 Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 20 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 21 Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 22 Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
 23 Id. at 685. 
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The Court’s next encounter with the limits of student speech came in 
1988 in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.24  By a 6–3 vote, the Court 
upheld a principal’s censorship of a high school student newspaper that was 
produced as part of a journalism class.25  The principal at Hazelwood East 
High School in St. Louis County, Missouri, objected to two articles, one on 
the experience of students with pregnancy, the other on the impact of divorce 
on students in the school.  Even with identifying information excluded for 
privacy purposes, the principal believed the articles were inappropriate for 
the school newspaper, and that students might still be identifiable in the 
articles.26 
The lawsuit was filed by former staff members of the newspaper, led by 
former editor Cathy Kuhlmeier.  A federal district court ruled for the 
school,27 but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.28  
The appeals court viewed the paper as a public forum and thus applied the 
Tinker standard, stating that the newspaper could only be censored if its 
content would cause material and substantial disruption to the school.29 
In the Supreme Court, Justice Byron White wrote for the majority that 
the newspaper was not an open forum for the exchange of ideas.  He 
distinguished Tinker, saying that case involved the right of students to speak, 
whereas the present case involved the decision of school officials not to 
promote particular speech in a school publication.30  Justice White wrote that 
educators should have the right to set high standards for student speech 
disseminated by the school, and must be able to control speech about sex, 
alcohol, drugs, and other sensitive subjects.31 
Justice White wrote for the Court: 
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for 
determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be 
the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.  Instead, we hold that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control 
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
 
 24 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 262–63. 
 27 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
 28 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 29 Id. at 1371–74. 
 30 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73. 
 31 Id. at 271–72. 
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activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.32 
The final rung in the Supreme Court’s post-Tinker trilogy was Morse v. 
Frederick.33  A high school student in Juneau, Alaska, stood across from his 
school as the Olympic Torch passed by in the procession to the 2002 Winter 
Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.  As the torch passed, the student, Joseph 
Frederick, held up a long banner that proclaimed “Bong Hits for Jesus.”  The 
school principal immediately confiscated the banner and suspended 
Frederick for ten days, maintaining that the banner advocated illegal drug 
use in violation of school rules.34  A federal district court in Alaska ruled for 
the school, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
found, using the Tinker standard, that there was no threat or prediction of a 
threat of disruption to the school.35 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled for the school 
officials.  The majority opinion, by Chief Justice John Roberts, was joined by 
four others and partially by Justice Stephen Breyer who wrote a separate 
concurrence and dissent.  Three Justices, John Paul Stevens, David Souter 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented entirely.  Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded that the school sponsored the watch-party for the Olympic Torch, 
and that the school had a strong interest in disavowing advocacy of illegal 
drugs.  Citing the dangers of illegal drug use, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
“The First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events 
student expression that contributes to those dangers.”36  Clarifying the scope 
of the holding, Chief Justice Roberts explained, “The concern here is not 
that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use.”37 
The upshot of these cases is mixed.  Tinker set the benchmark principle 
that students have a right to freedom of speech in public schools as a vital 
part of the educational mission of preparing them for their place in a 
 
 32 Id. at 272–73. 
 33 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 36 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
 37 Id. at 409. 
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democratic society.38  Bethel,39 Hazelwood,40 and Morse41 all reaffirmed the 
Tinker standard as the benchmark but distinguished it or limited its 
application when the cases involved lewd or vulgar school speech, or school-
sponsored speech that educators deemed inappropriate for pedagogical 
reasons, or speech advocating illegal drug use.42 
None of these cases deal directly with the issue that has jumped to the 
front-burner in the last twenty years with the advent of the Internet, the 
availability of laptops, tablets, cellphones, and more, and the wildfire spread 
of social media availability and use.43  That issue is the scope of the authority 
of school officials to discipline student expression that takes place away from 
school.  But while none of the four Supreme Court rulings dealt with off-
campus speech, all four shape the landscape and represent the only Supreme 
Court case precedents available to lower federal court judges who confront 
cases of students speaking beyond school property. 
II. SPEECH OFF-CAMPUS IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Cases involving student speech away from school take many forms.  Some 
involve what seem to be threatening speech, others bullying, still others 
speech critical of schools or school officials, and others speech deemed 
 
 38 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (describing the principle that 
students have a right to freedom of speech in public schools). 
 39 Bethel v. Fraser Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (illustrating support for the ruling in Tinker).  
 40 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (furthering support for Tinker).  
 41 Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (reaffirming Tinker). 
 42 For a summary of this view in a recent district court ruling, see B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 
F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2019). The court wrote: 
Under the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents, there are thus four rules: (1) 
“Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language;” (2) 
“Under Kuhlmeier, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech . . . on the basis of any 
legitimate pedagogical concern;” (3) Under Morse, a school may categorically prohibit 
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use; and (4) “Speech 
falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated only 
if it would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the right of others.”   
  B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 436 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (internal brackets and 
citations omitted).  
 43 One of the first off-campus speech cases did not involve the Internet or social media at all.  In Doe 
v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the discipline of a student who wrote threatening letters at home in 
the summer between the seventh and eighth grades.  The letters, addressed to a girl who had broken 
off a relationship with him, were not delivered by the student but were taken from the writer’s home 
and given to the girl at the start of the eighth-grade school year by another student.  The Eighth 
Circuit upheld his expulsion, treating it as threatening speech and so, not relying on Tinker at all. 
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inappropriate to particular circumstances.  These cases have been decided at 
every level of the federal courts, except the Supreme Court.44  The cases that 
have been appealed to the Supreme Court and rejected have covered a range 
of these issues.  
Part II of this Article examines a sampling of these cases, but it is not an 
exhaustive survey.  Section A examines a few of the more recent federal court 
rulings, and then in Section B, it surveys the cases in which the Supreme 
Court has denied certiorari.   
A. Recent Cases 
In one of the most recent cases, B.L. v. Mahanoy Area School District,45 a high 
school student—who was relegated to the junior varsity cheerleader squad 
after tryouts for sophomore year—was barred from the cheer squad for one 
year after a Snapchat post that read, “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer 
. . . .”  The post violated a cheerleading squad rule that prohibited negative 
comments on the Internet about the team or coaches and urged avoiding 
foul language.  The daughter of one coach took a screenshot of the Snapchat 
post and showed it to the coaches.46 
In a lawsuit by the student and her parents against the high school in 
Schuykill County, Pennsylvania, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania acknowledged that it remained an 
open question whether Tinker applies to speech uttered outside of school.  
The judge held that, “Coaches cannot punish students for what they say off 
the field if that speech fails to satisfy the Tinker or Kuhlmeier  standards.”47  The 
judge essentially found that the school district could not show actual or likely 
substantial disruption at school for purposes of the Tinker standard; nor could 
the school show that a Snapchat post on a student’s personal account, made 
 
 44 Many of these disputes are litigated in federal court because the claim is that school officials have 
deprived students of their federal constitutional right to freedom of speech.  Most such cases are 
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against local officials who, acting 
under color of state law, deprive anyone of a constitutional right.  For an example of a case filed in 
state court, see N.Z. v. Madison Bd. of Educ., 94 N.E.3d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (upholding 
discipline of student connected to a notebook and text messaging group invoking the name Dylan 
Klebold, one of the two Columbine, Colorado shooters in 1999). 
 45 Mahanoy, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (describing the girl that was removed from cheer for speaking 
negatively about it). 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. at 444. 
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on a weekend at a restaurant, with the student not wearing any kind of 
cheerleading uniform or official school clothing, was school-sponsored 
speech.  The message then is that the Tinker standard governed, but in a way 
that worked in the student’s favor. 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling in 
favor of the student.48  In a departure from the reasoning of many other 
courts, two of the three judges concluded that student speech that takes place 
off campus is entitled to the same First Amendment protection as any other 
expression and that the Tinker standard does not apply.49  The third member 
of the panel joined the ruling in the student’s favor but disagreed with the 
conclusion that the Tinker standard does not apply.50 
In another recent ruling, McNeil v. Sherwood School District 88J,51 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the year-long expulsion of a 
high school sophomore who created a “hit list” in his personal journal that 
was not shared with anyone.  The student’s mother found the diary and 
shared it with a therapist, who shared it with police, who shared it with the 
school.52  The federal district court in Oregon, ruling in a suit by the student 
and his parents, granted summary judgment to the school district.  
The Ninth Circuit panel said it was largely bound by an earlier circuit 
case, Wynar v. Douglas County School District,53 which established that while 
students “enjoy greater freedom to speak when they are off campus than 
when they are on campus, their off-campus speech is not necessarily beyond 
the reach of a school district’s regulatory authority.”54  In McNeil, the Ninth 
Circuit panel said the dispositive question was not whether the student 
intended to communicate the speech to anyone else.  Rather, the Ninth 
Circuit outlined a three-part test: 
 
 48 B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 19-1842, 2020 WL 3526130 (3d Cir. June 30, 
2020) (affirming ruling that school violated student’s free speech rights).  
 49 Id. at *12.  The panel's ruling in fact creates a new circuit split in off-campus student speech law.  Id. 
at *18 (Ambro, J., concurring in the judgment).  This Article has focused on the circuit split as to 
the application of Tinker to off-campus speech and the Supreme Court’s inaction on that split, but 
this holding—that Tinker does not apply at all—raises a different question that the Supreme Court 
may act on. 
 50 Id. at *16. 
 51 McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist., 918 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing acts not supported by 
freedom of speech in schools). 
 52 Id. at 703–05. 
 53 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 54 McNeil, 918 F.3d at 706. 
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We now clarify that courts considering whether a school district may 
constitutionally regulate off-campus speech must determine, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, whether the speech bears a sufficient nexus to 
the school.  This test is flexible and fact-specific, but the relevant 
considerations will include (1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the school 
caused or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the speech would reach and impact the school, and (3) the relation 
between the content and context of the speech and the school.  There is 
always a sufficient nexus between the speech and the school when the school 
district reasonably concludes that it faces a credible, identifiable threat of 
school violence.55 
Here, too, the jumping off point for the ruling is the application of the Tinker 
standard, especially in the first two parts of the Ninth Circuit test. 
In another case of relatively recent vintage, A.N. v. Upper Perkiomen School 
District,56 a federal district court rejected a motion for a preliminary 
injunction ordering a student readmitted to high school after he was 
suspended and notified of likely expulsion for an Instagram post.  The student 
took a piece of a video about gun violence based on the Sandy Hook 
shooting, called Evan, and spliced in a song, Pumped Up Kicks, which features 
menacing lyrics about gun violence.  He posted the video mash-up on 
Instagram anonymously under an account he had created using another 
name.  The post remained for two hours, but several students in the district 
saw it and posted comments asking if it was a threat.  The mother of another 
student saw the post and emailed school officials.  Another parent called the 
state police.57  
In a lawsuit by the student and his parents, the federal district court in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied the Tinker standard to out-of-
school speech, based on precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit,58 and held that the video on Instagram caused an actual disruption 
as well as an environment for predicting a likely disruption.59 
The trend in these most recent cases involving off-campus speech is clear, 
then.  The results may vary, but the differences are in the facts of the cases.  
All three courts used some variant of the Tinker standard in analyzing student 
 
 55 Id. at 707–08 (citations omitted). 
 56 A.N. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 57 Id. at 393–96. 
 58 See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d. Cir. 2013) (requiring a court to find 
with reasonable foreseeability that off-campus student speech would create a substantial disruption 
or material interference in school). 
 59 Upper Perkiomen, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 399–400. 
1146 TINKERING WITH CIRCUIT CONFLICTS [Vol. 22:4 
   
 
speech beyond the schoolhouse gate.  None of these cases has been appealed 
to the Supreme Court, but as the next Section will explore, they fit a pattern 
with the cases that have reached and been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
B.  The Supreme Court Passes 
The Supreme Court seems to have gone out of its way to avoid deciding 
a case involving regulation of off-campus student speech.60  This Section 
examines the cases in which the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on 
issues involving off-campus speech. 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District,61 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the one-semester 
suspension of an eighth-grade student in upstate New York who created an 
America On Line (AOL) Instant Messaging icon of a pistol firing a bullet and 
hitting a person’s head.  The icon was captioned with words suggesting his 
English teacher should be killed.  The student’s friends could see the icon, 
and one student notified the teacher and provided a copy.  The suspension 
followed.62 The Northern District of New York upheld the discipline. 
The Second Circuit used the Tinker standard and found that the Instant 
Messaging post “crosses the boundary of protected speech and constitutes 
student conduct that poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would 
come to the attention of school authorities and that it would ‘materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,’”63 quoting Tinker.  
The Supreme Court, without comment, declined to hear the petition for 
certiorari by the parents.64 
In Doninger v. Niehoff,65 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
focused on the qualified immunity of school officials at a high school in 
 
 60 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: A Missed 
Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1540 
(2017) (noting that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to address off-campus student 
speech); William Calve, Comment, The Amplified Need for Supreme Court Guidance on Student Speech Rights 
in the Digital Age, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 378–79 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
issue guidance on off-campus student speech).  
 61 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 62 Id. at 35–37. 
 63 Id. at 38–39 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).  
 64 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 552 U.S. 1296 (mem.), denying cert. to 494 
F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 65 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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Burlington, Connecticut.  School officials prohibited Avery Doninger from 
running for senior-class secretary because of a blog post she made from home 
referring to “douchebags” in the school administration who canceled an 
annual student battle of the bands and repeating what officials considered 
misinformation from an earlier mass email students had sent to parents.  The 
officials also barred students from wearing t-shirts supporting Doninger at an 
election assembly.  Doninger won the election on a write-in campaign but 
was not allowed to assume the office.66  
Doninger’s mother initially asked for an injunction ordering a new 
election.  When Doninger graduated, the injunctive relief was mooted, but 
Avery amended the lawsuit to ask for damages.  Both the federal district court 
in Connecticut and the Second Circuit found that any free speech claim 
Doninger might have was not clearly established at the time and, therefore, 
could not overcome claims of qualified immunity by the school officials.67  
The Second Circuit did, however, include a lengthy discussion of Tinker and 
the subsequent Supreme Court rulings on student speech.68  The Supreme 
Court declined to grant Doninger’s petition for certiorari, issuing no 
comment on the denial of review.69 
The case of Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools70 involved suspension of a 
senior at Musselman High School in Berkeley County, West Virginia, for 
ridiculing another student on a MySpace page.  About two dozen friends 
joined the MySpace page, and comments largely focused on suggesting that 
the target of the ridicule was a slut who had herpes.  The target of the 
ridicule’s father found out and complained to school officials.  The officials 
in turn suspended Kara Kowalski for ten days, barred her from the 
cheerleading squad for the school year, and locked her out of school social 
events for ninety days.71  A federal district court in West Virginia granted 
summary judgment to school officials and rejected Kowalski’s free-speech 
claim that the school violated the First Amendment.72 
 
 66 Id. at 339–43. 
 67 Id. at 352–53. 
 68 Id. at 344–45. 
 69 Doninger v. Niehoff, 565 U.S. 976 (mem.), denying cert. to 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 70 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 71 For a summary of the facts giving rise to the issue in Kowalski, see id. at 567–70. 
 72 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Pub. Schs., No. 3:07-CV-147, 2009 WL 10675108 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 
22, 2009). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit discussed Tinker at 
length73 and concluded, “we are confident that Kowalski’s speech caused the 
interference and disruption described in Tinker as being immune from First 
Amendment protection.”74  Without comment, the Supreme Court denied 
Kowalski’s petition for certiorari.75 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided J.S. v. Blue 
Mountain School District76 en banc in favor of an eighth grader who was 
suspended for ten days for creating a MySpace profile that made fun of her 
middle school principal.  Created at home on her own time and home 
computer, the MySpace page did not name the principal but used his official 
school photograph, listed the individual’s name as M-Hoe, and described 
him in derogatory ways, such as being somebody who enjoyed having sex in 
his office, and with profanity.77  In a lawsuit filed by the parents, a federal 
judge in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
granted summary judgment to the school district.78 
The Third Circuit used the Tinker test, assuming without actually 
deciding that it would apply to off-campus speech.79  The appeals court said 
it was indisputable that the MySpace profile did not cause actual disruption 
at the school, but the school district argued that it was reasonable for officials 
to have forecast that it would cause disruption.80   Rejecting this argument, 
the Third Circuit wrote, “The facts simply do not support the conclusion that 
the School District could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption 
of or material interference with the school as a result of J.S.’s profile.”81 
Despite the facts that the Blue Mountain case divided the Third Circuit, 8–
6, and that the school district lost, the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
without any comment.82  The Court denied the petition for certiorari despite 
 
 73 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 571–73. 
 74 Id. at 572. 
 75 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 
2011).  
 76 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 77 For a summary of the facts giving rise to the issue in Blue Mountain, see id. at 920–22. 
 78 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 
11, 2008). 
 79 Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 926. 
 80 Id. at 930. 
 81 Id. at 931. 
 82 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 
2011).  
 
June 2020] JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 
   
 
a five-judge concurring opinion that suggested that off-campus speech was 
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment and should not be 
limited by student speech cases,83 and despite a strong dissent that warned 
that the ruling “leaves schools defenseless to protect teachers and school 
officials against such attacks and powerless to discipline students for the 
consequences of their actions.”84  It is important to note that the dissenting 
judges wrote that they agreed with the use of the Tinker test, but “disagree 
with the Court’s application of that rule to the facts of this case.”85 
The Third Circuit ruling is notable because the same Court issued a 
second en banc ruling on the same day, also finding that a student’s free-
speech rights were violated.  In Layshock v. Hermitage School District,86 a senior 
at Hickory High School in Hermitage, Pennsylvania, created a fake, 
derogatory MySpace profile of his school principal.  This was done on his 
grandmother’s computer outside school hours.  The profile was viewed 
widely by Justin Layshock’s friends and eventually was discovered by school 
officials who suspended him for ten days and barred him for extracurricular 
activities and from his graduation ceremony.87  A federal district court in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of Layshock and his 
parents.88  
The Layshock case was not appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Third 
Circuit was unanimous in finding that there was insufficient evidence that 
the MySpace profile caused disruption at school or that there was enough of 
a connection between the profile and school to invoke Tinker.89  Notably, two 
judges wrote a concurring opinion to flag the open question in both Blue 
Mountain and Layshock, whether the Tinker standard can be used to regulate 
off-campus speech.90  Although there was no petition for certiorari in 
Layshock, there can be little doubt that Supreme Court Justices and their law 
clerks reviewing Blue Mountain were made aware of the decision and 
concurring opinion in Layshock and the questions raised about the reach of 
the Tinker standard. 
 
 83 Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 84 Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 87 For a summary of the facts giving rise to the issue in Layshock, see id. at 207–10. 
 88 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
 89 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. 
 90 Id. at 219–20 (Jordan, J., concurring); Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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When Taylor Bell, a senior at Itawamba Agricultural High School in 
Mississippi, posted a rap recording on his Facebook page and then on 
YouTube, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Bell v. Itawamba 
County School Board,91 weighed into the debate over school authority to punish 
off-campus speech.  Again, the Tinker standard was the order of the day.  
Bell’s rap lyrics suggest sexual misconduct by two coaches at his school with 
female students; sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit found the lyrics included 
profane and vulgar words and threatening language.  Bell was suspended for 
seven days, placed in an alternative school for the remaining six weeks of the 
grading period, and barred from school events.92  The  Northern District of 
Mississippi ruled for the school board in a lawsuit brought by Bell and his 
mother.93 
The Fifth Circuit ruled, 12–4, that Tinker was the governing standard, 
that Bell’s rap lyrics threatened teachers at the school, and that “a substantial 
disruption reasonably could have been forecast as a matter of law.”94  The 
views in the Fifth Circuit could not have been more polar opposite.  The 
majority wrote that “the real tragedy in this instance is that a high school 
student thought he could, with impunity, direct speech at the school 
community which threatens, harasses, and intimidates teachers and, as a 
result, objected to being disciplined.”95  
The leading dissent among several opinions saw the case quite differently, 
finding Bell to effectively be a whistleblower disclosing misconduct by two 
coaches.  The dissent argued that the majority:  
denigrates and undermines not only Bell’s First Amendment right to engage 
in off-campus online criticism on matters of public concern but also the rights 
of untold numbers of other public school students in our jurisdiction to 
scrutinize the world around them and likewise express their off-campus 
online criticism on matters of public concern.96 
 
 91 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 92 For a summary of the facts giving rise to the issue in Bell, see id. at 383–87.  
 93 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012). 
 94 Bell, 799 F.3d at 391. 
 95 Id. at 400. 
 96 Id. at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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The case received substantial attention.  In the Fifth Circuit, amici briefs 
were filed by Mary Beth Tinker97 and by the Student Press Law Center.98  In 
the Supreme Court, Bell’s petition for certiorari received support from 
amicus briefs from the Mississippi Center for Justice,99 a group of prominent 
rap artists,100 the Advancement Project,101 the Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education,102 Massachusetts Citizens for Children,103 and the 
Marion Brechner First Amendment Project.104  The Supreme Court denied 
the petition for certiorari without comment.105 
In C.R. v. Eugene School District,106 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a two-day suspension for a seventh grader who was accused 
of harassing two disabled sixth-grade students after school in a park that was 
adjacent to school property.  The students were enrolled at Monroe Middle 
School in Eugene, Oregon.  The harassment was reported by a school aide 
and included vulgar language and sexual comments aimed at the sixth 
graders.107  In a lawsuit filed by C.R.’s parents contesting the school’s 
authority over off-campus speech, a federal district court in Oregon granted 
summary judgment to the school officials.108 
A Ninth Circuit panel upheld the suspension, once again using the Tinker 
standard.  The Ninth Circuit wrote: 
 
 97 Brief of Amicus Curiae Mary Beth Tinker in Support of Appellants, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 799 F.3d (No. 12-60264), 2015 WL 6107618. Mary Beth Tinker was one of the original 
plaintiffs in the Tinker case after she wore a black armband to her middle school. 
 98 Brief of Amicus Curiae Student Press Law Center Filed in Support of Appellee, Seeking Reversal, 
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc, 799 F.3d 379 (No. 12-
60264), 2012 WL 2374248. 
 99 Brief of Mississippi Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Bell v. Itawamba 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315589. 
 100 Amici Curiae Brief of Erik Nielson, Charles E. Kubrin, Travis L. Gosa, Michael Render (aka Killer 
Mike) and Other Scholars and Artists, Bell, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315591.  
 101 Brief of Advancement Project and One Voice as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Bell, 136 
S. Ct. 1166 (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315592. 
 102 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the Student Press Law 
Center and the Foundation for Individual Rights In Education, Inc., In Support of Petitioner, Bell, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315590. 
 103 Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Citizens for Children In 
Support Of Petitioners, Bell, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9488473. 
 104 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project in Support of Petitioner, 
Bell, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9184817. 
 105 Bell, 136 S. Ct. 1166. 
 106 C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 835 F.3d 1142, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 107 For a summary of the facts giving rise to the issue in Eugene, see id. at 1145–47. 
 108 C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, No. 6:12-cv-1042-TC, 2013 WL 5102848 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2013). 
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In our digital age, a school’s power to discipline students for off-campus 
speech has become an increasingly salient question for the courts.  This case, 
however, presents us with an analog problem: Whether the School District 
overstepped its authority when it disciplined C.R. for engaging in sexual 
harassment a few hundred feet from the school’s physical boundaries, a few 
minutes after class let out.  Under this set of facts, we conclude that C.R.’s 
speech was tied closely enough to the school to subject him to the school’s 
disciplinary authority.  As imposed by the school, that discipline complied 
with the requirements of Tinker.109 
CONCLUSION 
What emerges from these cases, and numerous others not considered in 
the preceding section, is a kaleidoscopic image of school regulation of speech 
beyond the schoolhouse gates.  The cases have continued unabated in federal 
courts throughout the country for close to two decades.  As discussed in the 
preceding section, at least seven cases involving off-campus speech by middle 
and high school students have gone to the Supreme Court in the last dozen 
years, and all have been denied review by the Justices.  Several patterns are 
clear. 
First, federal judges consistently voice either overt or subtle frustration 
over the question unresolved by the Supreme Court as to whether the Tinker 
standard of material and substantial disruption applies to off-campus speech.  
Sometimes judges merely note that the Supreme Court has not resolved this 
issue.  At other times judges write separate opinions to flag the issue. 
Second, the issue of whether and how the Tinker standard applies to off-
campus speech has been squarely teed-up to the Justices of the Supreme 
Court on numerous occasions.  Among the seven cases in which certiorari 
has been denied, some certainly were not the best vehicles, as when the 
appellate court focused on qualified immunity and discussed the free speech 
concerns only tangentially.110  But in two of the denied cases, the appellate 
courts considered and decided the issues en banc, providing full and detailed 
deliberations as a vehicle for the Supreme Court to take up the challenge.111  
Between the Third Circuit in Blue Mountain and the Fifth Circuit in Bell, the 
 
 109 Id. at 1155. 
 110 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing a district court ruling on the 
basis of qualified immunity and without deciding the merits of off-campus student speech). 
 111 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 790 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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relationship between Tinker and off-campus speech was considered by thirty 
federal appeals court judges who produced eleven separate opinions. 
Third, if there is a common thread that explains the Supreme Court’s 
highly visible abstention from the issue of off-campus speech, it must be that 
the Justices do not perceive a conflict of authority among the federal appeals 
courts.  In Rule 10 of the Supreme Court’s procedures, the first consideration 
for whether petitions of certiorari will be granted is if a conflict exists among 
the federal appeals courts.112  
Since the Justices have not uttered a word of explanation in any of the 
seven denials of petitions for certiorari, it is impossible to know what they are 
thinking.  However, a close reading of the appeals court decisions in the seven 
cases suggests that they all agreed that Tinker was the standard to apply.  If 
there are differences in the cases, those variances are in the application of the 
Tinker standard to the facts rather than in differences in the law. 
Still, given the number of lower court opinions that note the uncertainty 
over whether Tinker applies to speech beyond the schoolhouse gate, the 
Supreme Court might want to consider taking up the issue in a future case 
and providing clear guidance to lower courts and school officials. 
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